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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The initial parties to this action included plaintiff John
Wagner Associates, dba Grabber Utah, and defendants Hercules,
Inc. and Modulaire Industries, Inc.

Prior to trial, defendant

Modulaire Industries Inc. and plaintiff John Wagner Associates,
dba Grabber Utah settled their disputes.

Defendant Modulaire

Industries Inc. is therefore not a party to this appeal.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether

the Court of Appeals erred

in deciding

that the mobile office units which Hercules leased from Modulaire
should be regarded as realty as a matter of law, and that the
leasing of the units is therefore within the scope of the Utah
Contractors'

Bond

statute, Utah

Code

Ann.

S 14-2-1

jet sea.

(1986).
2.

Whether

the Court of Appeals erred

in deciding

that Hercules' use of the Navy's land and its lease of the mobile
office units, when combined, constitute a real property interest
which is sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien
statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et seg. (1974 and Supp. 1986).
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published
at 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990).
filed, is attached as Addendum A.

A copy of the Opinion, as
References in this Petition

are to the attached Opinion.
JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (1990).

This appeal is from a decision

by the Court of Appeals, dated August 31, 1990, with an order
respecting a Petition for Rehearing entered November 26, 1990.
The

Court

Wagner.

of

Appeals

originally

awarded

attorneys'

fees

to

However, in an unpublished Order on Rehearing, dated

November 26, 1990, the Court amended its Opinion to delete the
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attorneys' fees award. A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum B.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

two determinative

forth in Addendum C.

statutory provisions

are set

They are Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute,

Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et seg. (1986) and Utah's Contractors'
Bond statute, Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et. seg. (1974 and Supp.
1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Petitioner

Hercules,

Inc.

(hereinafter

"Hercules") has an award/contract to produce missiles for the
United States Navy at a plant located on land owned by the federal government and controlled by the Navy.

(R. 234, Exhibit 2;

R. 248-249; R. 640, p. 104). On June 7, 1985, Hercules gave a
purchase

order

to

Modulaire

Industries

Inc.

(hereinafter

"Modulaire") under which Modulaire agreed to lease mobile office
units for Hercules' use for a period of 24 months.

(R. 640, p.

53 Exhibit 64). Modulaire transported thirty modular units measuring 14 feet by 60 feet to the plant site and assembled the
units together to form the shells of the two office units.

(R.

640, p. 69-70, Exhibit 71).
Because the interiors of the mobile office units were
unfinished, Modulaire contracted

with Space Building Systems

(hereinafter "SBS") to perform the interior finishing of the
units using demountable partitioning.
Exhibit 4).

(R. 640, p. 75-76; R. 170,

SBS subcontracted with plaintiff-respondent John

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Wagner Associates, dba Grabber Utah (hereinafter

"Wagner") for

materials used in completing the interiors of the units.
443).

(R.

Hercules never contracted with SBS or with Wagner to per-

form any work on the units.

(R. 640 p. 105-106).

Modulaire paid SBS in full all sums due and owing for
the work performed on the

interiors of the trailers, but SBS

filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code before paying Wagner under the subcontract.
p. 12; R. 443).

(R. 171; R. 640

Wagner made demand for payment from Modulaire

and Hercules, and upon their refusal to make payment

for the

materials, filed a notice of lien against an alleged interest s>l
Hercules

in

the

Navy's

property

with

the

Salt

Lake

County

Recorder, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et sea, (hereinafter the "Mechanics' Lien statute"), and subsequently filed this
action to foreclose on the lien.

(R. 443).

A cause of action

was also asserted against Hercules for failure to obtain a payment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1
(hereinafter the "Payment Bond statute").

et sea. (1986)

(R. 640, p.9).

The parties submitted various motions for summary judgment and memoranda in support thereof.

On March 22, 1988, Judge

Noel of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, granted Hercules' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Wagner's First Claim for Relief for mechanic's lien foreclosure, finding that Hercules' interest

in the

Navy's property was not alienable and that Hercules had no interest in the Navy's property sufficient to allow attachment under
the Utah Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1 et

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sect.

(R. 509-512).

In the same order Judge Noel denied Hercules'

Motion for Summary Judgment and Hercules1 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment concerning the Second Claim for Relief for failure
to obtain a payment bond.
Prior

(R. 509-512).

to trial, Wagner and Modulaire entered

into a

Stipulation of Dismissal and an Order of Dismissal, settling all
causes of action between them.

(R. 619-621).

Trial took place on July 12, 1988.
action

remaining

The only cause of

at trial was against Hercules for failure to

obtain a payment bond pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et

sea.

(R. 640, p. 9 ) . At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
found that Wagner had no cause of action against Hercules under
Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 (1986).

(R. 630-631).

The trial court

determined that the placing of these mobile office units leased
from Modulaire on the Navy's land by Hercules did not constitute
the construction, addition to, alteration or repair of a building, structure or improvement upon land as required by Payment
Bond statute.

(R. 628).

The trial court also determined that Hercules, by virtue of its placing these leased mobile office units on the Navy's
land, was not subject to the provisions of S 14-2-1 (1986) and
that Hercules therefore had no obligation to obtain a bond for
the benefit of Wagner.

(R. 628).

Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law were entered by the trial court on August 24, 1988.
(R. 623-629).
The Court of Appeals held that, as a matter of law, the
mobile office units constitute realty for purposes of the Payment

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Bond statute and that the leasing of the units is within the
scope of the statute.

The Court reversed and remanded the Dis-

trict Court's Judgment with instructions to find for Wagner on
that issue.

Opinion at p. 18.

The Court of Appeals also con-

cluded that the alienability of an owner's property interest is
not a precondition to the attachment of a mechanic's lien and it
reversed the District Court's Order granting summary judgment to
Hercules on this issue.
reinstated and remanded.

Wagner's foreclosure action was thus
Opinion at p. 18.
ARGUMENT

A Writ of Certiorari is appropriate when the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.
Appellate Procedure, R. 46(b).

Utah Rules of

The decision of the Court of

Appeals in this case conflicts with this Court's decision in Paul
Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d
1982).

1279 (Utah

A Writ of Certiorari is also appropriate when the Court

of Appeals has decided an important question of state law which
has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
R. 46(d).

Id.,

This case presents a question as to whether a contract

for the construction of missiles which is not alienable can be
construed

as

a property

interest

attachment of a mechanic's lien.

which

could

be

subject

to

The Opinion of the Court of

Appeals misapprehends the Payment Bond statute, the Mechanic's
Lien statute, and the cases cited interpreting these statutes.
This

Court,

therefore,

should

grant

a

Writ

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

of

Certiorari

reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating
the District Court's Order and its Judgment.
I." THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION THAT THE LEASED MOBILE
OFFICE UNITS CONSTITUTE REAL RATHER THAN PERSONAL PROPERTY CONFLICTS WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The Court of Appeals correctly acknowledges "the gen-

?

eral principle

that the modular buildings must be regarded as

realty before the Payment Bond Statute will apply."
p. 8 (emphasis added).

Opinion at

This Court has articulated a test for the

express purpose of determining whether property is real or personal.

See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Diary Ass'n, 657

P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982).

Nevertheless, in the present casef the

Court of Appeals refused to apply the test set forth in Mueller,
disregarded

the factual findings of the trial courtf

and con-

cluded on its own that the mobile office units constitute realty
for

purposes

of

both

the

Payment

Bond

and

Mechanics'

Lien

statutes.
Utah's Mechanics' Lien and Payment Bond statutes are
similar in nature, similar in language and identical in purpose.
The

Mechanics'

Lien

statute

provides

that

persons

furnishing

materials used in the construction or improvement of any building, structure, or improvement to any premises shall have a lien
on the property for which they furnish materials.

A lien granted

under this statute can only attach to such interest as the owner
may have in the property.
and Supp. 1986).

Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3 ejt sea. (1974

Similarly, the Payment Bond statute provides

that the owner of any interest in land entering into a contract

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for the construction or improvement of any building, structure or
improvement

upon land shall obtain from the contractor a bond

conditioned

for

the faithful performance

of

the contract

and

prompt payment for materials furnished and labor performed under
the contract.

Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986).

The statutes are read ^n pari materia and are applied
equally and consistently to the same fact situation.

The simi-

larity between the Mechanics' Lien statute and the Payment Bond
statute was noted

long ago by the Utah Supreme Court

Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke. 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241

in Rio

(1917), in

which the court upheld the constitutionality of Utah's Bond statute.

Id. at 128, 167 P. at 246.

(1) owners of an interest

Both of these statutes apply to

in land (2) for construction, addi-

tions, alterations, or repairs to any building, structure, or
improvement on the land.
Court

noted

that

In Rio Grande Lumber Co.. the Supreme

the Utah Bond statute

"is auxiliary

to our

mechanic's lien law, and just as much in aid of it as if it had
been made a part of it and incorporated

in the same chapter."

id. at 124, 167 P. at 245.
Materials become an integrated part of real property
only when annexed to the land or made a part of some permanent
structure on the land.

Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283; Stanton Trans-

portation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 190, 341 P.2d 207, 211
(1959);
(1906).

Eccles

Lumber

Co. v. Martin.

31 Utah

241, 87 p.713

In Mueller, supra, this Court established a tripartite

test to be used in distinguishing between real and personal property for the purpose of establishing whether a conversion from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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personal to real property has occurred.
ulated by the Court are:

The three factors artic-

(1) The manner in which the item is

annexed to realty; (2) Whether the item is adaptable to the particular use of the realty; and (3) The intention of the annexor
to make an item a permanent part of the realty.

It is apparent

that the Mueller test is fact specific.
The Mueller Court determined that an item is "adaptable" to the particular use of the realty when it is integrated
into real property to further a specific purpose for which the
real property has been devoted.

657 P.2d at 1283-84.

The court

stated, however, that personal property located on real property
that is adaptable to multiple uses does not become "adapted" simply because the presence of the personal property determines the
use of the real property at a particular time.

657 P.2d at 1284.

In the instant case, the property was vacant and highly adaptable
to multiple uses.

(R. 640, p.120-121).

Placing these trailers

on the property did nothing to further any specific purpose for
which the property could be devoted.

The trailers are used as

temporary offices and do not have any special integration with
the real property.

(R. 640, p.54, 106-107).

The adaptation

prong of the Mueller test has therefore not been met.
Another important prong of the Mueller test is whether
the parties intended the property to be personal property or real
property.

657 P.2d at 1284.

In this case, the "intention" of

the parties to retain the personal property characteristics of
the units
The

is strongly supported by the transaction documents.

written

quote

from Modulaire

to Hercules

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was

for mobile

office units, specifying both setup and dismantling charges.
218, R 640, p.53).

(R.

In addition, each trailer is required to have

a Manufacturer's Statement of Origin and to have a Motor Vehicle
License under Utah
127-128).

law.

(R. 640, p.82-87, Exhibits 118-122,

Since each trailer is classified as a motor vehicle by

the Department of Motor Vehicles, each unit is issued a license
plate and a certificate of title, and is thereafter taxed as personal property.

Id.

Therefore,

the

annexation,

the

adaptation

and

the

intention prongs of the Mueller test have not been met and the
property must be regarded as personalty rather than realty.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the
Utah Supreme Court did not limit the applicability of the Mueller
test to the issue of whether equipment had become an improvement
upon the land.

Opinion at p. 8.

The Court of Appeals attempts

1

Valuable insight also is obtained from the tax provisions of
Utah law. Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-601(1) (Supp. 1987), defines the
trailers as mobile homes, since they are inter alia transportable
in one or more sections with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained within the structure and used for commercial purposes when erected on-site on a foundation. The tax provisions further provide that a mobile home is permanently affixed
when anchored to, and supported by, a permanent foundation. Utah
Code Ann. S 59-2-601(2) (Supp. 1987). Mobile homes are taxed as
real property if (1) the mobile home is permanently affixed; (2)
the owner of the mobile home and the real property to which the
mobile home is affixed files an affidavit of affixture; and (3)
the certificate of title or manufacturer's certificate of origin
of
the
mobile
home
is
surrendered.
Utah
Code
Ann.
SS 59-2-602(1) - (3) and 59-2-603 (Supp. 1987). Liens against a
mobile home that has been converted to real property must then be
perfected in the manner provided for liens on real property.
Utah Code Ann. S 59-2-602(5) (Supp. 1987). The trailers in the
instant case, however, are still vehicles or mobile homes. They
were not converted to real property by the process set forth by
statute.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to distinguish Mueller from the present case on the grounds that
the subject property in Mueller is dairy equipment, whereas the
subject property in this case is a "building," which, by fiat of
the Court of Appeals, is realty.
question.

Such a distinction begs the

Moreover, it ignores the test designed to make the

determination

of whether

property

is real

or personal.

The

Mueller test applies where, as here, the issue is whether the
subject property is personal or real.
in side stepping

The Court of Appeals erred

the Mueller test, in not applying

it to the

facts of this case, and in legislating that mobile trailers are
per se realty.
Furthermore,

_
the

Court

of

Appeals

cites

Waldorf

v.

Elliot, 214 Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355 (1958), in support of its argument that the units in question were "buildings" and therefore
realty.

Opinion, at p. 9.

However, the Waldorf court actually

used the same tripartite test set forth in Mueller to determine
2
whether the property in question was realty or personalty.
In

2

The Waldorf decision indicates that the most important element in the tripartite test was the intent of the parties. It
stated: "The tendency found in modern decisions is to stress the
third test — that of intention — making it controlling where
there is doubt as to the effect of the two others [annexation and
adaptation]."
330 P.2d at 357. As the trial court found, the
intention of Hercules and Modulaire was clearly to have these
mobile office units remain personalty because they anticipated
that Modulaire would someday remove them from the property, as it
had done with other trailers leased to Hercules. Some of these
trailers previously removed from Hercules ended up at Word Perfect's property in Provo.
(R. 640, p. 115). Hercules cannot
understand why the Court of Appeals believes it should have to
satisfy a Bond claim where the benefit of the work may be enjoyed
by future lessees of the trailers.
The intention that the trailers remain personalty is also
evidenced by the fact that Modulaire's written quote to Hercules
Footnote continued on next page.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Waldorf, the issue was whether certain grain tanks located on
property being sold to Mr. and Mrs. Waldorf were personal property and not part of the sale, or whether the grain tanks were
real property and included in the sale.

Even though the court

considered the tanks to be "buildings," that determination did
not conclusively indicate the buildings were realty.

The court

said that determination simply shifted the burden of proof to the
party

claiming

the

property

retained that character.
burden

of

proof;

the

was

personalty

330 P.2d at 357.
evidence

adduced

to show

that

it

Hercules has met that
at

trial

established

clearly that the mobile office units are personalty.
As both Mueller and Waldorf show, whether property is
real or personnel

is a fact specific

issue.

The trial court

denied Hercules' Motion for Summary Judgment and Renewed Motion
for Summary Judgment concerning Wagner's Claim for Relief under
the Payment Bond Statute precisely because it found the existence
of factual issues relating to the trailers and whether they could
truly be considered improvements to the Navy's land.

See

Order

of the District Court, point 3, attached as Addendum D.

In so

ruling, the trial court correctly apprehended that whether the
mobile office units constitute realty or personalty is a threshold issue of fact which must be determined before the court can
decide

whether

the

Payment

Bond

statute

applies.

On

this

Footnote continued from previous page.
for the mobile office unit complex included both setup and dismantling charges.
(R. 218). Based upon this intention, the
mobile office units remained personalty and therefore were outside the scope of the Payment Bond and Mechanics' Lien statutes.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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important fact question, the trial judge listened to the testimony, viewed the evidence, and reached his decision.
of Appeals, downplaying

The Court

and ignoring the work of trial court,

ruled that the issue was one of law, not fact.

Opinion at p. 6.

In so deciding, however, the Court of Appeals erred because it
ignored the rule of law this court established in Mueller.
The error the Court of Appeals made regarding the deference owed to the trial court lead directly to the erroneous
conclusion

that

the

leasing

arrangement

between

Hercules

and

Modulaire was a contract within the scope of the Payment Bond
Statute.

Opinion at p. 6-7 n. 4.

and overreaching.

This conclusion is erroneous

SBS, not Hercules, contracted for the con-

struction of the mobile office units.

Hercules was not a party

to that contract nor did it negotiate that contract with Wagner.
Wagner was a subcontractor of SBS, SBS was a subcontractor of
Modulaire, and Modulaire was the lessor of the units.

The con-

tract between SBS and Wagner involved Hercules only to the extent
that Hercules would someday lease the mobile office units for
which Wagner was providing materials.

Hercules, therefore, did

not contract with Wagner for the construction of the units, as
3
required by the Payment Bond statue.

3

The use the Court of Appeals makes of the stipulation at
trial as to the contractual chain as a basis for its conclusions
of law is somewhat incredible in light of the fact that parties
frequently stipulate at trial as to contractual chain to eliminate the need for extensive evidence.
The mere fact that
Hercules stipulated that it was in a contractual chain certainly
was not meant to demonstrate that it was part of a construction
project. Hercules has always maintained that it is nothing more
than a lessee of mobile trailers.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial court's finding that the mobile office units
were never made part of the Navy's land is not clearly erroneous.
The standard for review of the trial court's Findings of Fact is
set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

It provides, in

pertinent part:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility the
witnesses. . . .
This Court has recently upheld this standard in Butler v. Leet
108 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

See also State

v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987).

In Walker, the

Utah

Supreme

Court

quoted

Wright

& Miller

in defining

that

standard:
The appellate court. . . does not consider
and weigh the evidence de novo.
The mere
fact that on the same evidence the appellate
court might have reached a different result
does not justify it in setting the findings
aside.
It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
Id. at 193 (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure,
S 2585 (1971)).

Thus, under the "clearly erroneous" standard of

Rule 52(a), this Court will uphold the Findings of Fact entered
by the trial court unless this Court determines that the findings
are against

the clear weight of the evidence, or unless this

Court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
mistake has been made.

that a

Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.

In its effort to reach the conclusion that the mobile
office units are realty, the Court of Appeals not only abandons
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the guidance provided by this Court, but leaves logic and common
sense behind as well.

The Court states:

Although the modular buildings may constitute personal property as between Hercules
and the Navy because they have not been permanently anchored to the land, and although
the lease agreement may have caused the
buildings to retain their personal property
status as between Hercules and Modulaire, as
between Hercules and its materialman, Wagner,
we regard the buildings to be real property.
Opinion at p. 13 (emphasis added).

Petitioner

is aware of no

authority or rational basis for the proposition that property may
be

considered

both

real

and personal

simultaneously.

In so

deciding, the Court of Appeals has simply pronounced its desired
outcome without supporting it with sound legal analysis.

II.

HERCULES IS NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH'S MECHANICS'
LIEN STATUTE BECAUSE IT HAS NO ALIENABLE
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY ON WHICH THE COURT
COULD FORECLOSE TO SATISFY WAGNER'S LIEN.4
The purpose of Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute

prevent

the owners

of

land

from having

their

lands

is to

improved

i

*
Because the materials supplied by Wagner were never converted to realty under the Mueller test, the Mechanics' Lien
statute does not apply.
As discussed above, the trial court
found, as a matter of fact, that the mobile office units were not
realty for purposes of the Payment Bond statute. However, the
Mueller test applies directly to the issue of whether property is
realty or personalty for purposes of the Mechanics' Lien statute.
Mueller, 657 P.2d at 1283.
Therefore, reinstating the trial
court's judgment and giving deference to its findings of fact, as
this Court should, necessarily removes this case from the scope
of the Mechanics' Lien statute as well. It is true that such a
result leaves this plaintiff without a remedy, but fashioning
such a remedy is the province of the state legislature, not of
the courts.
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without having to pay the reasonable value for the materials and
labor provided.

Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d

413, 416, 335 P.2d 837, 839 (1959); Rio Grande Lumber Co., 50
Utah at 127, 167 P. at 246.

A mechanic's lien is a judicial

mechanism to obtain for suppliers of goods or services payment
for their labors and wares.

When a lien is claimed on property,

Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-15 provides that "[t]he court shall cause
the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as
in the case of foreclosure of mortgages. . . ."

The issue,

therefore, is whether the Mechanics' Lien statute applies when
the party defendant owns no alienable interest in the property in
dispute.
The land on which the mobile office units are located
is owned by the United States Government and is under the jurisdiction of the Navy.
104).

(R. 234, Exhibit 2; R. 248-249; R. 640, p.

However, the United States Navy did not contract for the

lease, placement, or finishing of the units.

The government is

not a party to the contract involved in this action, and Hercules
is not acting on behalf of the United States.

Furthermore, the

mobile office units for which Wagner supplied materials are neither public buildings nor public works within the scope of the
Miller Act and therefore the Navy's land cannot be the subject of
a lien and a subsequent sheriff's sale, or judicial sale.

5

In a related case, United States For The Use Of Idaho Western, Inc. v. Modulaire Manufacturing and Hercules, Inc., filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, the plaintiff was a party in the same position as
Wagner, having contracted with SBS to supply materials for the
Footnote continued on next page.
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Hercules uses the land without any lease, but pursuant
to an award/contract.

(R. 639, p. 31).

Hercules is allowed to

use the land only for so long as it uses the land for work on
government contracts,

id.

Hercules is not the owner of the land

and it has no interest to which a mechanic's lien could attach.
Nor does it have an interest which could possibly be sold at a
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale.
It is clear from Utah law that Hercules' interest can
in no way be considered a lease.

Four factors must exist for a

valid lease: (1) A binding contract in compliance with the statute of fraud; (2) Possession by the tenant; (3) Legal title in
the

landlord;

granted.
(1978).

and

(4) A

leasehold

that

is capable

of

being

Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66
Here, the second factor, possession by the tenant, has

not been satisfied.

Hercules is using the Navy's land pursuant

to its award/contract, and has the right to use the land only so
long as it uses it to work on government contracts.

Hercules

does not have legal possession of the land, which is necessary
for a valid lease to exist.

"The concept of where legal title

remains is important in distinguishing a lease from other legal
relationships.

Likewise it is important in determining who has

possession rights.

For example, the landlord/tenant relationship

Footnote continued from previous page.
same mobile office units, and having not been paid.
In that
case, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins dismissed the action with prejudice
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
since the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Miller Act, 40
U.S.C. S 270(a) et sea.
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is distinguished from the licensor-licensee relationship in that
the licensee never gains exclusive possession of the land; he
receives only permission to use it."

Id. at 565, note 2.

Her-

cules' Use Agreement is just that, a use agreement, and Hercules
clearly does not have "exclusive possession of the land."
The

district

court

correctly

found

that

Hercules'

interest in the land is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be attached under the Utah Mechanics' Lien statutes,
Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et sea.
The Court of Appeals argues that the District Court's
ruling would contravene the purpose of the Mechanics' Lien and
Payment Bond statutes and would encourage owners of property to
structure their dealings in such a way as to avoid the applicability of the statutes.

Opinion at p. 15.

bility of any such conduct occurring
remote at best.
government
Second,

in the business world is

First, making missiles for the United States

is an

few of

However, the possi-

infrequent,

the companies

even

rare, business

making

missiles

for

States government likely operate on government land.

enterprise.
the United
Third, of

those missile-making companies operating on United States government

land,

very

few

likely

operate

in mobile

office

units.

Finally, even fewer of those companies are likely to have situations involving subcontractors who do not get paid for their work
by a bankrupt contractor and thus attempt to assert a mechanic's
lien on the property.

The argument is without merit.
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The

Court

of

Appeals'

solution

to

the

fact

that

Hercules owns no alienable interest in real property benefited by
Wagner is unworkable and illogical.

The Court states:

Hercules has two separate and distinct property interests: (1) an equitable interest in
the
Navy's
land
pursuant
to
the
award/contract; and (2) an equitable interest
in the buildings pursuant to a leasing
arrangement with Modulaire.
When combined,
these two component interests constitute the
property that was benefited by Wagner's materials. Wagner's lien attached to this cumulative property interest. We believe that in
order to give full effect to the Mechanic's
Lien Statute, Wagner may pursue the sale of
the component property interests separately.
Opinion

at p. 16-17

(emphasis added).

However, the Court of

Appeals fails to reveal the alchemy by which a court may combine
two unrelated property interests, neither of which is individually capable of supporting a lien, creating therefrom a cumulative property interest which is capable of having a lien attached
to it, and then selling off the component interests separately.
The Court of Appeals' solution is without any theoretical or practical value.

First, as discussed above, Hercules has

no interest in the Navy's land which could possibly be sold at a
sheriff's sale or other judicial sale.

Second, as determined by

the trial court, the mobile office units leased from Modulaire
were not annexed to the land, and thus the requirement that the
units be real property is not met.

Therefore, the notion that

these interests, when combined, constitute an interest that can
support a lien is nonsense.

The doctrine espoused by the Court

of Appeals would allow courts to create something out of nothing.
Such a doctrine ignores a basic tenant of our system that we live
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and conduct our business by rule of law promulgated by a legislature, not by rule of a few persons to whom the legislative power
was not entrusted.
Furthermore, the solution of the Court of Appeals' is
unworkable as a practical matter.
to structure such a sale.

There is no satisfactory way

Since the award/contract with the Navy

entitles Hercules to use the Navy's land only for so long as
Hercules is manufacturing missiles for the Navy, a foreclosure
sale would terminate Hercules' right
chaser would acquire nothing.

immediately and the pur-

In sum, the Court of Appeals'

solution is an illogical theory with no application in the real
world.
CONCLUSION
The Modulaire trailers leased to Hercules were personal
property and did not become part of the Navy's land by virtue of
the fact that Hercules leased them from Modulaire.

Therefore,

this Court should affirm the trial court's conclusion that the
placing of these leased mobile office units on the Navy's land by
Hercules pursuant to its lease with Modulaire did not constitute
the

construction,

addition

to,

alteration

or

6

repair

of

a

In light of the practical impossibility of implementing the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, it is ironic that the court
quotes the Utah Supreme Court in Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis,
"When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and application
of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its purpose in light
of its background and history, and also to the effect it will
have in practical application."
9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d
207, 209 (1959), quoted in Opinion at p. 5 (emphasis added). The
opinion of the Court of Appeals provides no solution which is
workable or enforceable.
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building,

structure,

or

improvement

upon

land

as

required

by

Utah's Contractors' Bond statute, Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann.
(1986), and that it did not place Hercules within the class of
persons subject to the provisions of Section 14-2-1.

And this

Court should affirm the trial court's Judgment dismissing with
prejudice Wagner's Complaint.
Hercules has no interest in the land to which a mechanic's lien would attach.
remedy under

Consequently, there is in this case no

the Mechanics' Lien statute because

there

is no

interest in the land which could possibly be sold at a sheriff's
sale or other judicial sale.

This Court should therefore affirm

the District Court's finding that Hercules' interest in the land
is not alienable and that it is not sufficient to be attached
under Utah's Mechanics' Lien statute, Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-1, et
sea., and this Court should affirm the District Court's Order
dismissing with prejudice Wagner's First Claim for Relief in its
Complaint.
DATED this 2C^

day of December, 1990.

^

^J&MES M."ELEGANTE
MARK S. WEBBER
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondent
Hercules, Inc.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Plaintiff

and Appellant,

' A*v
» ;Mi.
*.

John Wagner Associates, d/b/a
Grabber Utah,

: mu

^

, « . . r • *%•?•..*

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Hercules, Inc., Modulaire
Industries, Inc., and John Does
i-x,

Case No. 890017-CA

Defendants and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Darrel J. Bostwick and Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
James M. Elegante and Mark S. Webber, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davidson, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff, John Wagner Associates, d/b/a Grabber Utah
(Wagner), appeals the dismissal of its complaint against
defendant Hercules, Inc. (Hercules). Wagner sought to recover
compensation for construction materials supplied by Wagner for
two modular buildings constructed on behalf of Hercules. We
reverse and remand.
Hercules has an award/contract to build missiles for the
United States Navy at its Bacchus Works plant. The plant is
located on land owned by the federal government and controlled
by the Navy. In order to obtain additional office facilities
at the site, Hercules leased two modular office complexes from
Modulaire Industries, Inc. (Modulaire). The lease, which was
entered into in June 1985 for a term of two years, included an
option to renew and an option to buy. Modulaire transported
thirty modular units measuring fourteen feet by sixty feet to
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the plant site and assembled the units together to form the
shells of two sizable buildings.
Modulaire subcontracted with Space Building Systems (SBS)
to provide labor and materials to finish the 25,000 square feet
of office space inside the buildings. Wagner supplied drywall
and other construction materials to SBS for the interior
finishing. After the interior work was completed, SBS owed
Wagner a balance of $14,300.03 for supplies and materials.
Before Wagner was able to collect the outstanding balance,
however, SBS filed for bankruptcy. Demand by Wagner for
payment from Modulaire and Hercules was unsuccessful.
Wagner filed a notice of mechanic's lien against the
property with the Salt Lake County Recorder, pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 et. seq. (1988)
(hereafter, the Mechanic's Lien Statute), and subsequently
filed this action to foreclose on the lien. A cause of action
was also asserted against Hercules for failure to obtain a
payment bond as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et. seq.
(1986) (hereafter, the Payment Bond Statute).1
The trial court dismissed Wagner's foreclosure action on
summary judgment, ruling that no mechanic's lien was available
because Hercules's interest in the land was inalienable. The
payment bond cause of action went to trial. Following a bench
trial on the payment bond claim, the trial court found in favor
of Hercules on the ground that Hercules's leasing of the office
units did not "constitute the construction, addition to,
alteration or repair of a building, structure, or improvement
upon the land."
Wagner appeals, seeking reversal of the summary judgment
and reinstatement of its foreclosure action. Wagner also seeks
reversal of the final judgment on its payment bond cause of
action and remand to the trial court for determination of
damages under the Payment Bond Statute.
We are asked to interpret two similar statutes: (1) the
Payment Bond Statute which requires an owner to obtain from the
contractor a payment bond prior to the construction of a
1. A third cause of action was asserted against Modulaire for
breach of an agreement to issue joint checks payable to both
SBS and Wagner. Wagner and Modulaire, however, settled prior
to trial and Modulaire is not a party to this appeal.
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building in order to guarantee that materialmen and laborers
will be paid;2 and (2) the Mechanic's Lien Statute which
2.

The Payment Bond Statute provides in relevant part:
14-2-1 Bond to protect mechanics and
materialmen.
The owner of any interest in land
entering into a contract, involving $2,000
or more, for the construction, addition to,
alteration, or repair of any building,
structure, or improvement upon land shall,
before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to
the contract price, with good and sufficient
sureties, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt
payment for material furnished, equipment
and materials rented, and labor performed
under the contract. This bond runs to the
owner and to all other persons as their
interest may appear. Any person who has
furnished or rented any equipment or
materials, or performed labor for or upon
any such building, structure, or
improvement, for which payment has not been
made, has a direct right of action against
the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the rented materials or
equipment furnished, for the reasonable
value of the materials furnished, or for
labor performed, not exceeding the prices
agreed upon. This right of action accrues
40 days after the completion, abandonment,
or default in the performance of the work
provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any
person interested, upon request.
14-2-2 Failure to require Bond - Direct
liability - Limitations of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of
this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such
good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the
same, as herein required, shall be
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creates a lien against the improved property in favor of the
contractors^ subcontractors, and materialmen.3
(Footnote 2 continued)
personally liable to all persons who have
furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable
value of such materials furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in any
case the prices agreed upon. Actions to
recover on such liability shall be
commenced within one year from the last
date the last materials were furnished or
the labor performed.
Section 14-2-1 was amended in 1987 and in 1989. 1987 Utah
Laws 218; 1989 Utah Laws 271; see also Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1
(Supp. 1990).
3.

The Mechanic's Lien Statute provides in relevant part:
38-1-3 Those entitled to lien - What may be
attached. ..
Contractors, subcontractors, and all
persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or
equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any building
or structure or improvement to any premises
in any manner and licensed architects and
engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications,
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or
superintendence, or who have rendered other
like professional service, or bestowed
labor, shall have a lien upon the property
upon or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor, or furnished or
rented materials or equipment for the value
of the service rendered, labor performed, or
materials or equipment furnished or rented
by each respectively, whether at the
instance of the owner or of any other person
acting by his authority as agent,
contractor, or otherwise. This lien shall
attach only to such interest as the owner
may have in the property.
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-When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation and
application of a statute, it is appropriate to look to its
purpose in the light of its background and history, and also to
the effect it will have in practical application." Stanton
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207,
209 (1959). "[T]hese statutes should be interpreted and
applied in such a manner as to carry out the purpose for which
they were created: to protect those who supply labor and
materials-" Kino Bros., Inc. v. Utah Drv Kiln Company, 21 Utah
2d 43, 45, 440 P.2d 17, 18 (1968) (referring to Payment Bond
Statute). See also Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982) (Mechanic's Lien Statute to be
construed broadly to protect materialmen and laborers).
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's
lien law manifestly has been to protect,
at all hazards, those who perform the
labor and furnish the materials which
enter into the construction of a building
or other improvement. The result has been
that the owner of the premises, at whose
instance and for whose benefit the
improvement is made, has been the one most
likely to suffer loss. He pays at his
peril the original contractor, who
generally needs it and demands it as the
work progresses.
If he does not reserve enough of the fund
in his own hands to pav for the labor of
subcontractors and employees, and the

price of materials, he incurs the risk of
having to pav over again for at least a
part of these items.

. . . The bond, as in this case[,] is
conditioned for the faithful performance
of the contract and securing the payment
of the laborers and materialmen. If the

owner requires the contractor to procure
the statutory bond/ he is protected
against loss. If he does not, he becomes

liable to laborers and materialmen if the
contractor fails to pay them, even though
he may have paid the contractor in full.
He has his remedy in his own hands.
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Rio Grande Lumber Co. v, Darke, 50 Utah 114, 122, 127, 167 P.
241, 244, 246 (1917) (emphasis added).
Even though the two statutes have similar language and
similar purposes and have often been treated without
differentiation, we will address the statutes separately in the
interest of clarity.
Inasmuch as the issues before us are limited to questions
of law, namely, questions of statutory interpretation, no
deference need be given the trial court's conclusions. Forbes
v. St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). We
therefore review the trial court's statutory interpretations
for correctness. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
PAYMENT BOND STATUTE
Wagner claims it was error for the trial court to conclude
as a matter of law that the interior work done after assembly
of the modular units did not constitute the "construction,
addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, structure,
or improvement upon land."
The legal issue before us is whether the leasing of the
modular buildings was outside the scope of the Payment Bond
Statute because the buildings might be considered personalty
rather than realty. We hold that, for purposes of the Payment
Bond Statute, the modular buildings are to be regarded as
realty as a matter of law, and that the leasing of modular
buildings is therefore within the scope of the Payment Bond
Statute.
When stripped of its extraneous provisions, the plain
language of section 14-2-1 of the Payment Bond Statute requires
that "[t]he owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction . . .
of any building . . . obtain from the contractor a bond . . .
•" Application of this plain language to the uncontroverted
facts of the present case provides a ready result.

i

Hercules entered into a contract with Modulaire to lease
two modular office buildings. The lease agreement with
Modulaire constituted a contract for the construction of a
building involving $2,000 or more. 4 Wagner provided
i

4. The lease arrangement entered into between Hercules and
Modulaire constituted "a contract" for the construction of a
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materials for the buildings which were built under Hercules1s
lease agreement with Modulaire. Wagner did not receive payment
from SBS for the materials. Hercules did not obtain a payment
bond whereby Wagner could receive payment for the materials
following SBS's failure to pay Wagner. Hercules is therefore
personally liable to Wagner under section 14-2-2. See Kino
(Footnote 4 continued)
building. The parties stipulated at trial to the following
contractual chain; -Hercules being at the top of a contract
train, Modulaire being the second, Space Building Systems being
third. . . . And then Grabber Utah, Plaintiff here involved in
the chain." Hercules stipulation that it was in the contract
chain for the construction of the complexes necessarily implies
that its lease arrangement with Modulaire constituted a
contract for the construction of a building.
Even absent the parties' stipulation, the leasing
arrangement constitutes a contract for the construction of a
building on its own merits. The purchase order by which
Hercules leased the complexes from Modulaire states: -These
complexes will be built to Hercules specification no. 9106.(emphasis added). The purchase order also states -Installation
to be complete as soon as possible. Hercules will be
responsible for site preparation, sewer, water and electrical
service hookups.- The purchase order also provided for one
time charges for -delivery, set-up and skirting- of the
complexes which were to be billed separately from the monthly
lease payments. The construction contract between Modulaire
and SBS similarly refers to Hercules as the -Owner- and
Modulaire as the -Contractor.In any event and in view of the foregoing indicators that
the lease was viewed by the parties as a contract for the
construction of a building, we conclude as a matter of law that
the leasing arrangement was such a contract. If a lessee
enters into an agreement to lease a building which is not
currently on its land but will be constructed by the lessor,
the lessee is necessarily entering into a contract to construct
the building upon its land or the land in which it has an
interest. The construction of the building is necessary before
the lease may become effective. By entering into the lease the
lessor incurs an obvious contractual obligation to build the
building. Inherent in such a lease is a contract for the
construction of the building itself or else the lease agreement
would be void and of no effect.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

890017-.CA

*

Bros., Inc.. 440 P.2d at 19 (shipment of materials to the job
site and their consumption in the construction of a building
was "a sufficient basis upon which to predicate liability for
defendant's failure to obtain the bond.")*
Despite the apparently clear applicability of the Payment
Bond Statute, Hercules contends that the modular buildings did
not become part of the realty as is required before the Payment
Bond Statute may be applied. We recognize the general
principle that the modular buildings must be regarded as realty
before the Payment Bond Statute will apply. The issue
therefore becomes whether these modular buildings are to be
regarded as realty for purposes of the Payment Bond Statute.
Physical Nature of The Modular Buildings
Hercules seeks to avoid liability through application of
the personal property "integration" test found in Paul Mueller
Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah
1 9 8 2 ) . 5 T h e trial court applied the Mueller test to
determine whether the modular buildings had become integrated
into the land and found that they had not. The trial court
therefore concluded that the leasing of the modular office
complexes did not constitute the construction of buildings. In
effect, the trial court concluded that in order for a building
to be a "building" under the Payment Bond Statute, it must be
permanently anchored to the soil. There is, however, no such
requirement.
The test established in Mueller does not apply to the
present case because the issue addressed in Mueller is not the
issue before us. The Payment Bond Statute applies when work is
done on, or materials are provided for, (1) any building, (2)
any structure, or (3) any improvement upon land. Section
14-2-1. Mueller dealt solely with the issue of whether whey
drying equipment was an "improvement upon the land." The
5. At issue in Mueller was whether whey drying equipment
became part of the realty. The Utah Supreme Court considered
the following three factors to determine whether the equipment
had been sufficiently integrated into the realty so as to
create a mechanic's lien: (1) the manner in which the
equipment was attached or annexed to the realty; (2) whether
the equipment was adaptable to the particular use of the
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make the
equipment a permanent part of the realty. Mueller, 657 P.2d at
1282.
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present case, on the other hand, involves the construction of
"buildings" which is a separate and distinct category. In
other words, the Mueller test for determining whether personal
property had become an improvement upon land does not resolve
the present issue of what constitutes a building•
If we were to adopt the Mueller test for what constitutes
an improvement upon land as the test for what constitutes a
building, we would effectively destroy the statutory "building"
category. This we may not do because it would alter the
materialman's burden of proof. "(T]he fact that the properties
in question were buildings is of itself sufficient evidence
that they were affixed to and became part of the realty. . .
." Waldorf v. Elliott, 214 Or. 437, 330 P.2d 355, 357 (1958).
If a materialman can prove that its materials were consumed in
a building, that is all the statute requires. We refuse to
impose the additional requirement that a materialman go further
and also prove that the building is an improvement upon the
land.
Hercules fails to provide a single payment bond case
requiring that a modular building be permanently anchored to
the land. Hercules instead invokes the principle of in pari
materia and relies upon mechanic's lien cases to establish a
requirement that buildings be permanently anchored to the land
before the Payment Bond Statute will apply. We are not
persuaded. Our mechanic's lien cases, in fact, are either
silent or support the opposite conclusion.
The first mechanic's lien case cited by Hercules is Stanton
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207
(1959). In Stanton, subcontractors sought to foreclose
mechanic's liens for the costs of transporting a drilling rig
to the defendant's property and for tools used in the project.
The Stanton court did not discuss whether a building must be
permanently anchored to the land in order for a mechanic's lien
to attach. In fact, the circumstances of the case support the
opposite conclusion since a mechanic's lien was granted by the
trial court for the labor expended in erecting the drilling
rig, a temporary structure.
The second mechanic's lien case offered by Hercules is
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906). At
issue in Eccles was whether the plaintiff had properly complied
with the recording requirements of the lien statute. Again,
whether a building must be permanently anchored to the soil was
not discussed by the court.
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A third mechanic's lien case that was not cited by
Hercules, but that we find particularly persuasive on this
issue is Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, modified in
part, 85 P. 1012 (1906). In Sanford, a mechanic's lien was
granted for labor and material against a house that had been
removed from the property upon which it was constructed and
placed on another lot. The Utah Supreme Court held that the
removal of the house did not destroy the lien on the land or on
the house. We believe that if the actual removal of a building
from the land will not defeat the attachment of a mechanic's
lien to the building, then the mere intent to remove a
building, as evidenced by the temporary manner in which the
building is attached to the land, should not be permitted to
defeat a lien, or, in this case, the Payment Bond Statute.
"It is settled . . . that a building need not be physically
anchored to the land to be considered realty. It may be found
to be a fixture though it is secured to the realty by force of
gravity alone." Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d
451, 453 (1957).
There is no reason why one object should not
be deemed a fixture merely because it is
heavy and requires no attachment when a
lighter object can be said to have passed
the test of annexation because its lightness
requires some sort of device to attach it to
the realty. The method of attachment does,
of course, in some cases conclusively
establish the article as part of the
realty. The method of attachment, however,
does not ever conclusively establish that
certain articles are not a part of the
realty . . . ."
Waldorf v. Elliott, 330 P.2d at 357 (prefabricated grain tanks
of imposing size and weight that appeared to be permanent
constituted buildings even though they were attached to land by
gravity alone).
The issue then becomes simply whether or not the modular
office complexes are buildings. -What is a building must
always be a question of degree; but ordinarily the word refers
to a structure enclosing a space within walls and roof." 12
C.J.S. Building (1980) (footnotes omitted).
Hercules describes the office complexes as temporary
trailers. This characterization is inaccurate. Hercules did
not simply lease a few trailers to be used as portable offices;
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it leased two "complexes" from Modulaire. Modulaire delivered
thirty modular units measuring fourteen feet by sixty feet that
were assembled together in a stationary fashion to create two
buildings that together contained over 25,000 square feet of
office space, complete with electricity/ plumbing, climate
control systems, sidewalks and parking lots.
The so-called "trailers" were nothing more than sections of
a building that were transported to the building site upon
their own wheels rather than upon a truck bed, a fact which is
not controlling. See generally Thorp Finance Corp. v. Wright,
16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (1965). Nor is it controlling
that the units are taxed as self-contained mobile homes. !£.
399 P.2d at 208. It should also be noted that, according to
the evidence submitted to the trial court, these units did not
necessarily have four walls but were in fact designed to open
into the neighboring units once assembled. We therefore
conclude that these modular units could not be considered
individual self-contained trailers.
Hercules argues that since the buildings were modular and
could be disassembled and removed from the site, they were not
permanent. We consider the buildings sufficiently permanent
because they were assembled in a stationary manner and because
Hercules could, if it so desired, retain the buildings on the
Navy's land indefinitely by exercising its option to extend the
lease or its option to purchase the buildings. Hercules has,
in fact, extended the lease several times and has indicated its
intention to purchase the buildings. Hercules has built
parking lots and sidewalks around these buildings, as if they
were to remain permanently. We also note the considerable
expense incurred by Hercules in locating these modular
buildings on the site and the significant expense that Hercules
would incur in removing the buildings.
The fact that a stationary modular building is deliberately
designed, assembled and installed in order to be disassembled
and removed at some later date with relative ease does not
prevent it from being a building. "Modern Authority . . . has
minimized the importance of the method by which the article is
attached or annexed to the realty." Waldorf v. Elliott. 330
P.2d at 357. We "must acknowledge that prebuilt [buildings],
mobile or otherwise, . . . are a part of our changing society,
and give recognition to the fact that the law must be
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responsive to the best interests of those whom it is designed
to serve-w Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 681-82, 604 P.2d 818,
819-20 (1980).
Legal Nature of the Modular Buildings
Hercules also argues that the lease agreement with
Modulaire prevented the buildings from becoming realty. The
Utah Supreme Court has already addressed this argument in a
similar fact situation and rejected it. Metals Manufacturing
Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914 (1964).
In Metals Manufacturing, the Bank of Commerce was the
lessee of a building under a ten-year lease. A provision of
the lease granted to the Bank the right to "make alterations,
attach fixtures and erect additions, structures or signs" which
were to remain the personal property of the Bank and which
could be removed from the building by the Bank. The Bank,
without obtaining a payment bond, contracted to have aluminum
gates and railings installed, and paid the contractor for their
installation. The contractor, however, did not pay the
plaintiff who had supplied the gates and railings and the
plaintiff sued for damages under the Payment Bond Statute.
The Bank argued that the intention of the Lessor and Lessee
that the fixtures remain personal property, as evidenced by the
lease, prevented the installation of the railings from being
-an addition, alteration or repair of any building, structure
or improvement on land" because the owner of the building and
land would not receive any permanent benefit from the
modifications.
The bank leans heavily on the principle
that whether facilities such as these are
part of the realty depends on the
intentions of the parties. Generally this
is true and binds the parties to the
lease. However, it would seem to be
unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude
that such parties by agreement among
themselves, could bind third party
suppliers of materials to the terms of an
agreement to which such suppliers were not
privies and the terms of which they do not
know. Such conclusion could result in
easy circumvention of the statute whose
purpose clearly is to protect suppliers,
if what they supply falls within the clear
import of the statute.

a n/>/> i •»
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!£., 395 P.2d at 915. Sfifi also Kino Bros., Inc. 440 P.2d at 19
(materialmen have "no practical way" of knowing details of
arrangements between an owner of a building and others who have
actual title to the ground).
Hercules's assertion that a private agreement may prevent
improvements from becoming realty for purposes of the Payment
Bond Statute would effectively exclude from the scope of the
statute all construction of, or improvements to, leased modular
buildings. Under Hercules's approach, unsuspecting materialmen
would be left unprotected for materials provided for leased
modular buildings. The lessee of the modular building,
however, would receive the direct benefit of such modifications
without incurring any responsibility for payment. This result
would be directly contrary to the purpose of the Payment Bond
Statute.
The purpose of the mechanics' and
materialmen's lien statutes and likewise
the [Payment Bond Statute] is to prevent
the owners of land from having their lands
improved with the materials and labor
furnished and performed by third persons,
and thus to enhance the value of such
lands, without becoming personally
responsible for the reasonable value of
the materials and labor which enhance the
value of those lands.
Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc.. 8 Utah 2d 413, 416, 335
P.2d 837, 839 (1959).
The fact that a lease was used as the contract whereby the
buildings were constructed is of no consequence when it was
Hercules who caused the buildings to be built, thereby causing
the consumption of Wagner's materials, and it was Hercules's
leasehold interests that were directly benefited by the
materials.
Summary as to Nature of The Buildings
Although the modular buildings may constitute personal
property as between Hercules and the Navy because they have not
been permanently anchored to the land, and although the lease
agreement may have caused the buildings to retain their
personal property status as between Hercules and Modulaire, as
between Hercules and its materialman, Wagner, we regard the
buildings to be real property.
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Our holding gives full effect to the purpose of the
Payment Bond Statute which is that the risk of loss be borne by
"the owner of the premises, at whose instance and for whose
benefit the improvement [was] made." Rio Grande, 167 P. at
244. By failing to obtain a payment bond, Hercules ignored its
statutory duty to insure Wagner's payment and is therefore
personally liable to Wagner.
MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE
Wagner also argues that it was error for the trial court
to dismiss its mechanic's lien foreclosure action due to its
conclusion of law that Hercules's interest in the real property
was inalienable and therefore insufficient to be attached under
the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The issue before us then is
whether alienability is a precondition to the attachment of a
mechanic's lien. We hold that there is no such precondition.
The Mechanic's Lien Statute does not require that an
owner's interest in real property be alienable before a
mechanic's lien may attach. The only applicable precondition
to the attachment of Wagner's mechanic's lien is that Wagner
furnish "any materials . . . used in the construction
. . . of any building." Section 38-1-3.
An alienability test, as adopted by the trial court, would
be impossible to administer because of the unique nature of
each real estate transaction. There is a multitude of
"interests" an "owner" may have in property that may be
liened,6 each with its own unique degree of alienability.
For example, a donated parcel of property may have a
reversionary interest in the event the property is no longer
used for the purpose for which it was donated. Similarly, a
lease may be unassignable, or may require written landlord
approval prior to assignment. The possible degrees of
alienability are limited only by the ingenuity of the parties
6. It is well established that the holder of an interest in
realty which is less than fee title in the soil may be
considered an owner for purposes of the Mechanic's Lien
Statute. Kino Bros.. Inc., 440 P.2d at 19. A mechanic's lien
may attach to a leasehold estate, e.g. Interiors Contracting,
Inc., 648 P.2d at 1386, or an equitable interest pursuant to a
real estate contract, e.g. Roberts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190,
479 P.2d 345 (1971), or a building which has been removed from
the land upon which it was constructed, Sanford 85 P. at 366.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

890017-CA

14

involved. There is no clear line indicating that one degree of
alienability would be sufficient and another would be
insufficient. The unavoidable result would be confusion and
arbitrariness in our mechanic's lien law.
We believe that the question of alienability is adequately
provided for in the language of the Mechanic's Lien Statute.
Alienability is but one of the rights contained in the bundle
of property rights which an owner may possess. A mechanic's
lien attaches "to such interest as the owner may have in the
property." Section 38-1-3. We interpret this phrase to allow
attachment of a mechanic's lien to the entire bundle of
property rights belonging to the owner, whatever it may
contain, without any requirement that any particular right,
such as unrestrained alienability, be present.
If we were to exceed the plain language of the Mechanic's
Lien Statute'and impose the additional requirement that the
property interest of an owner be sufficiently alienable before
a mechanic's lien could attach, we would create great
uncertainty which would, in effect, shift the risk of loss to
materialmen and laborers. Materialmen and laborers, who have
"no practical way" of knowing the legal status of the property
they improve, Kino Bros., Inc., 440 P.2d at 19, would not know
in advance whether the property they are improving is tainted
by a restraint on alienability. In such cases materialmen and
laborers would bear the risk of loss, rather than the owner who
has received the benefit. This is contrary to the clear goal
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute which is that the property owner
bear the risk of loss. See Rio Grande Lumber Co.. 167 P, at
244.
Ultimately, recognizing alienability as a precondition to
the attachment of a mechanic's lien would destroy the
Mechanic's Lien Statute. Owners could easily circumvent the
Mechanic's Lien Statute by simply creating an inalienable
interest in the land or in the building. We will not adopt a
rule permitting such ready circumvention of the Mechanic's Lien
Statute. Metals Manufacturing Co.. 395 P.2d at 915.
We also conclude that our reasoning above, that a building
need not be permanently anchored to the soil before the Payment
Bond Statute will apply, is equally applicable to the
Mechanic's Lien Statute. The Mechanic's Lien Statute provides
in relevant part that "all persons . . . furnishing . . . any
materials . . . used in the construction, alteration or
improvement of any building, . . . shall have a lien upon the
property upon . . . which they have . . . furnished . . .
materials . . . ." Section 38-1-3.
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Again, the Mueller test does not apply because the statute
expressly refers to three types of modification to real
property each carrying different tests. A mechanic's lien is
expressly created for the value of materials supplied for the
construction of a building. A materialman therefore only needs
to prove that its materials were consumed in the construction
of a building. The issue again becomes whether the modular
office complexes constitute buildings for purposes of the
Mechanic's Lien Statute. We conclude, for the same reasons
stated above, that these sizable stationary modular complexes,
complete with electricity, plumbing, climate control systems,
sidewalks and parking lots, constitute buildings for purposes
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The buildings are sufficiently
permanent in that they may remain on the site indefinitely at
Hercules's discretion.
Wagner provided drywall materials that were consumed in
finishing the interiors of the modular buildings. Wagner
therefore has a lien against the improved property. The issue
then becomes, to what property does the lien attach? Hercules
claims that a mechanic's lien cannot attach because its
interest in the land cannot be "sold judicially." To focus
solely on Hercules's interest in the land, however, ignores
other property interests belonging to Hercules to which a
mechanic's lien might properly attach.
In order to effectuate the purposes of the Mechanic's Lien
Statute, the words "property," "realty," and "land" are to be
broadly construed to include all property interests affected.
The word "land" as used in the law, has
since time immemorial been regarded as a
generic term. It ". . . includes not only
the soil, but everything attached to it,
whether attached by the course of nature,
as trees, herbage and water, or by the
hand of man, as buildings, fixtures and
fences." This is particularly true with
respect to these lien statutes which
should be liberally construed to
effectuate their purpose.
Kino Bros. , Inc., 440 P.2d at 19 (quoting 42 Am. Jur. Property,
p. 196, and adding emphasis) (footnote omitted).
Hercules has two separate and distinct property
interests: (1) an equitable interest in the Navy's land
pursuant to the award/contract; and (2) an equitable interest
in the buildings pursuant to a leasing arrangement with
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Modulaire. When combined, these two component interests
constitute the property that was benefited by Wagner's
materials. Wagner's lien attached to this cumulative property
interest. We believe that in order to give full effect to the
Mechanic's Lien Statute, Wagner may pursue the sale of the
component property interests separately.
[I]t has become quite generally recognized
that at least in certain circumstances a
mechanic's lien may attach to and be
enforced against buildings or improvements
alone. Thus a mechanic's lien upon
improvements separately [sic] from the
real estate has been upheld where the
improvements and the land are not owned by
the same party . . . or where the building
constitutes a trade fixture and is thus
not a part of the realty and is removable
by the tenant or a licensee.
53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens § 257 (1970) (footnotes
omitted).
In the present case, the buildings are owned by Modulaire
and the land is owned by the Navy.7 Hercules brought these
two separate ownerships together by virtue of its contract with
the Navy and its lease with Modulaire. Where, as Hercules has
argued, these buildings may easily be removed from the land
without causing great injury to the land or the buildings, and
where Hercules has shown that it has the right to remove the
buildings, Hercules's component property interests may be sold
separately at judicial sale. See Sanford, 85 P. at 367 (the
7. Hercules argued on appeal that the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A.
§§ 270(a) et seq. (West 1986), which requires the procurement
of performance and payment bonds on any public building or
public work of the United States, applies to prevent a
mechanic's lien from attaching to the Navy's land. This issue
was raised for the first time on appeal and we need not address
it. Heiner v. S.J, Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 115 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). However, in order to clarify the property
interest being attached, we will point out that Wagner's lien
attaches only to Hercules's interest in the land, whatever that
might be, unless the improvements were made at "the instance
o f the Navy. Interiors Contracting , Inc.. 648 P.2d at 1386.
The Miller Act therefore does not prevent the attachment of the
lien to Hercules's interest and may only apply if Wagner were
to try to attach the Navy's interest in the land. Inasmuch as
that issue is not before us, we do not speculate on how the
Miller Act may apply in that circumstance.
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supreme court directed the trial court to order the sale of the
original lot first; if the proceeds were insufficient to
satisfy the liens, the house was to be sold) modified in part,
30 Utah 379, 85 P. 1012, 1013 (1906) (clarifying that the
purchaser of the house at judicial sale would have the right to
remove the house from its new location).
CONCLUSION
We find that the modular buildings, as a matter of law,
constitute realty for purposes of the Payment Bond Statute.
The trial court's determination that Hercules's leasing of the
modular buildings did not constitute the construction of "any
building" was therefore an erroneous conclusion of law. Based
on the uncontested facts, we remand and instruct the trial
court to find for Wagner and to determine the reasonable value
of the materials furnished in accordance with section 14-2-2,
Wagner's reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to section 14-2-3,
and any other remedy to which Wagner may be entitled under the
Payment Bond Statute.
We also conclude that alienability of an owner's property
interest is not a precondition to the attachment of a
mechanic's lien. The trial court's dismissal of Wagner's
foreclosure action based on the purported inalienability of
Hercules's property interest in the land was therefore based on
an erroneous conclusion of law. We find that the modular
buildings, as a matter of law, constitute realty for purposes
of the Mechanic's Lien Statute. The foreclosure action is
therefore reinstated.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Costs and reasonable attorneys fees on
appeal awarded to appellant Wagner pursuant to section 14-2-3.
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ADDENDUM C
Utah Code Annotated S 14-2-1 et seg. (1986)
14-2-1.

Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.

The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain
from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price,
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed under
the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person who has furnished
or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor for or
upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment has not been made, has a direct right of action against the
sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the rented
materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable value of the
materials furnished, or for labor performed, not exceeding the
prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the
work provided for in the contract.
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested,
upon request.
14-2-2.
Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation
of actions.
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to
exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable
to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case
the prices agreed upon.
Actions to recover on such liability
shall be commenced within one year from the last date the last
materials were furnished or the labor performed.
14-2-3.
Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen Attorney's fee.
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall
be taxed as costs in the action.
14-2-4.

Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees.

Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a
mortgage or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to
obtain theDigitized
bondby thedescribed
in Library,
S 14-2-1,
imposes
any liability
Howard W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clarkor
Law School,
BYU.
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upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained
such a bond.
Utah Code Annotated S 38-1-3 (1974 and Supp. 1986)
38-1-3.
Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on
ores mined.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs,
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the
property upon or concerning which they have rendered service,
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials
or equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at
the instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises included within the
lease.
336/122190B
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ADDENDUM D
.1

raa

A.

rt

T/tj/ff

JAMES B. LEE (A1919)
/JAMES M. ELEGANTE (A0968)
'MARK S. WEBBER (A4940)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant Hercules, Inc
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

JOHN WAGNER ASSOCIATES,
d/b/a GRABBER UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
HERCULES, INC., MODULAIRE
INDUSTRIES, INC. and JOHN
DOES I-X,

Civil No. C86-404
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

Defendant

Modulaire

Industries1,

Inc.

("Modulaire")

Motion for Summary Judgment, in which defendant Hercules, Inc.
("Hercules") joined, came on

regularly

for hearing before the

Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel on Friday, August 14, 1987 at 10:00
a.m.

Plaintiff John Wagner Associates ("Wagner") was represented

by Robert F. Babcock and Kurt Faux; Hercules was represented by
James M. Elegante, and Modulaire was represented by Steven T.
Waterman and Marco B. Kunz.
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Hercules1 Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel on
Friday, February 26, 1988 at 10:00 a.m.

Wagner was represented

by Darrell J. Bostwick and Hercules was represented by James M.
Elegante.

Modulaire did not appear nor was it represented.
The Court

having considered

the pleadings

and other

papers on file herein, having heard the arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

This

Order

supercedes

and

replaces

the

Order

signed by the Court on September 16, 1987 and entered that same
day and supercedes and replaces the Order signed by the Court on
September 24, 1987 and entered that same day.
2«

The Court finds that the interest of Hercules in

the subject property

is not alienable.

Since the Court finds

that the interest of Hercules is not alienable, the Court holds
that said

interest

is not sufficient

to be attached under the

Utah mechanic's lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1, et seq.
Therefore,
Wagner's

Wagner's

First

Claim

Complaint, mechanic's

for

lien

Relief

as

set

foreclosure,

forth

in

is dismissed

with prejudice.
3.

The Court finds that Hercules may be defined as an

"Owner" under Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1(1)(b).

However, the Court

finds that there exist genuine issues of material fact which bear
on

the

question

of

whether

-2-

the

improvements
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upon

the

*

property are of the kind and nature which are covered by the Utah
private construction bonding statutes, Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-1 et
seq.

Therefore,

Hercules1
Second

Renewed

Claim

failure

to

Hercules1
Motion

for Relief

obtain

Motion

for
as

a bond,

for

Summary
set

forth

is denied

Summary

Judgment

Judgment

and

concerning

the

in Wagnerfs
and

the

Complaint,

factual

issues

relating to the kind and nature of the improvements are reserved
for trial.
4.
material
joint

The Court finds that there exist genuine issues of

fact which bear on Wagner's Third Claim

check

Therefore,

agreement,
Hercules'

as

set

Motion

for

forth

in

Summary

for Relief,

Wagner's

Complaint.

Judgment

concerning

Wagner's Third Claim for Relief is denied and the factual issues
relating to the alleged joint check agreement are reserved for
trial.

A
ENTERED this &(h day of March, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

$1f/4*A //HA
"i)ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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c;

(
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the
following on this

day of March, 1988:

Robert F. Babcock
Darrel J. Bostwick
Walstad & Babcock
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
Steven T. Waterman
Marco B. Kunz
Watkiss & Campbell
310 So. Main Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300

*\±J V
242:031888B
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